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Abstract: This article assesses the US debacle
in Afghanistan in light of the Vietnam War and
US forever wars.
U.S. Army soldiers from the 10th Mountain
Division return home from a nine-month
deployment to Afghanistan at Fort Drum, New
York, on Dec. 10, 2020.
 
The Warning Signs
Over a nearly twenty-year period, the US war
in Afghanistan is estimated to have cost about
$2.2  trillion  and  resulted  in  over  240,000
deaths, military and civilian, on all sides. (See
the  relevant  charts  below from the  Costs  of
War  Project  at  the  Watson  Institute,  Brown
University.)  Now,  as  we watch  the  Taliban’s
takeover of Afghanistan, we may pause—as we
did on Vietnam in 1975—to wonder how things
could  have  gone  so  badly  after  such  an
extraordinary investment of blood and treasure.
But  in  truth  there’s  no  reason  to  wonder:
Precisely because of the defeat in Vietnam, the
underlying reasons for the Afghanistan debacle
should  have  been  anticipated,  in  fact  were
identified years ago, and should have dictated
nonintervention or early withdrawal. We were
warned, but presidents from George W. Bush to
Donald  Trump  chose  to  cont inue  the
intervention  just  as  presidents  during  the
Vietnam war chose, despite numerous signs of
failure  in  conception  and  not  merely  in
execution.
I’m just one observer, and far from the most
expert, but I did note the warning signs some
time ago. In October 2015 I wrote (Post #96):
“We  are  now  witness  in  Afghanistan  to  the
same  scenario  US  presidents  confronted  in
Vietnam: public lies, private doubts. While the
US military is reassuring the public that Afghan
forces  are  up  to  the  task  of  defeating  the
Taliban, the situation on the ground is anything
but reassuring. Afghan government forces are
in retreat, the ISIS organization in Afghanistan
(many  are  former  Taliban)  is  expanding
operations, al Qaeda and Taliban forces remain
strong, and US drone strikes continue to hit
civilian  targets.  The  ‘endless  war’  [Obama]
sought  to  avoid  is  a  reality—something  he
should have foreseen, and for all we know did
foresee, years ago.” But rather than withdraw
from Afghanistan in the face of looming defeat,
Obama  did  what  Lyndon  Johnson  did  in
Vietnam: He increased US forces.
 
Pathologies of Decision Making
When the Washington Post published what it
calls  the “Afghanistan Papers” at  the end of
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2019, based on interviews that included many
US civilian and military  officials,  we learned
that the roots of failure had been widely known.
For  example,  John  F.  Sopko,  who  in  2014
served  as  special  inspector  general  for
Afghanistan  reconstruction,  told  the  House
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  that  U.S.  officials
have routinely lied to the public throughout the
war.  They  exaggerated  Taliban  casualties,
understated  Afghan  military  success,  and
massaged  data  to  show  gains  in  Afghans’
education and health care— even though they
“knew the data was bad.” “There’s an odor of
mendacity throughout the Afghanistan issue . . .
mendacity  and  hubris,”  Sopko  said  in
testimony.  .  .  “The  problem  is  there  is  a
disincentive, really, to tell the truth. We have
created an incentive to almost require people
to  lie”  (Washington  Post,  January  14,  2020).
And  what  US  officials  didn’t  lie  about,  they
classified,  said  Sopko:  “It  turns  out  that
everything that is bad news has been classified
for the last few years,” referring to the Trump
administration.
Official  lying  and data  manipulation  are  just
two of the elements of decision making failure
that are strikingly similar to what I found in the
Pentagon Papers. Among them: 
Unwarranted optimism
Confusion  of  activity  (money  and
projects) with impact
Lack  of  clarity  about  what  winning
means
Persistence  in  believing  in  nation
building
Prioritizing  military  over  economic  and
social needs
Failing to reflect on basic assumptions
Americanization of “their” war.
 
Options?
Joe Biden will likely pay the political price for
the failure of his predecessors to confront those
disorders. As in critiques of Vietnam decision
making,  Biden  will  be  taken  to  task  for  not
seeking  total  victory,  for  abandoning  the
Afghanis,  for  not  staying  in  Afghanistan  at
lower  cost,  and  for  failing  to  anticipate  the
speed of the Taliban nationwide victory.. Total
victory is and always has been a pipe dream: If
a half million troops couldn’t “win” in Vietnam,
it’s  ridiculous  to  think  that  several  hundred
thousand troops could win in Afghanistan. The
abandonment  critique  is  also  easily  refuted:
Trump’s call to get out under the cover of a
spurious  agreement  with  the  Taliban  could
have  led  to  US  withdrawal  several  months
earlier than Biden’s timetable called for. 
The  low-cost  option,  which  Steve  Coll  has
recently  proposed,  would  amount  to  “a
sustained,  smaller  deployment—not  free,  but
nothing  l ike  the  expenditures  of  the
past—linked  to  a  search  for  some  more
sustainable political outcome . . . ” (Interview
with Isaac Chotiner,  “How America Failed in
Afghanistan,”  The  New  Yorker,  August  15,
2021.)  This  option,  too,  is  not  persuasive:  It
repeats the Vietnam error of false choices. In
this bureaucratic game, an Option B is created
for the president that is designed to be more
palatable than either Option A, escalation, or
Option C, withdrawal. But Option B rests on the
delusion  that  both  the  costs  (to  America)  in
lives and dollars, and the political optics (for
the president) of fewer body bags, will improve
matters for an invading force just because the
US  profile  will  be  lower.  The  “sustainable”
option  does  nothing  to  promote  a  peaceful
outcome  or  help  the  long-suffering  Afghan
people, but it does promise continuation of the
endless war. In a word, it’s an immoral choice
and an ineffective one.
The  real  options  in  Afghanistan  were  most
fundamentally  constrained  by  American
exceptionalism and hubris at the highest levels,
just  as  they  were  in  Vietnam.  As  Robert
McNamara  observed,  years  too  late,  in  his
memoir,  In  Retrospect:  The  Tragedy  and
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Lessons  of  Vietnam:
 
We  did  not  recognize  that  neither  our
people  nor  our  leaders  are  omniscient.
Where our own security is not directly at
stake, our judgment of what is in another
people’s or country’s best interest should
be put to the test  of  open discussion in
international forums. We do not have the
God-given right to shape every nation in
our own image or as we choose.
 
Sadly, the Afghan debacle underlines the fact
that our leaders can’t seem to learn that lesson.
 




Mel Gurtov is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University and Senior
Editor of Asian Perspective. His latest book is America in Retreat: Foreign Policy Under
Donald Trump (Rowman & Littlefield). You can find out more about him in his blog, In the
Human Interest.
In addition to this article and Ben Kiernan's "Backdrop to the Fall of Kabul: A Comparative
Reflection" posted on The Asia-Pacific Journal, here are a few other sources from recent days
with hopefully interesting ideas about the current situation in Afghanistan.
A Zoom interview with Benon Sevan, a longtime senior official with the UN and former
personal representative of the secretary-general from 1988 to 1991. Mr. Sevan
comments on the futility of nation building in Afghanistan, the American misadventure,
and the prospects for international cooperation in working with the Taliban, among
other issues.
My blog post, "The Afghanistan Debacle" on which this article was based on is also
available as a podcast.
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This is an expanded version of a text that appeared in the blog. 
 
 
